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Abstract 
After ten years of membership visible differences in the way the two 
countries use development funds intended for convergence are beginning to 
evolve although both joined the European Union at the same time. Despite 
the similarities in the problems needing to be remedied through their regional 
development policies, identical timeframes and the proportionately equal 
development funds, there is an order of magnitude in the differences in the 
quantitative use of the cohesion funds in the final third of the seven-year 
programme. Hungary is nearly 20 percent behind Poland in absorption of the 
Cohesion Fund and the European Social Fund, and according to European 
Commission statistics published in November 2013 Poland is also ahead in 
accessing the Regional Development Fund. This paper is intended to explore 
institutional differences in the in the regional policies of the two countries, 
how they evolved, and how they were amended over time. My investigation 
covers the institutions and fund usage starting with accession to the 
European Union and ending with the programme cycle of 2007-2013, as well 
as progress in preparations for the Partnership Agreement and operative 
programmes that follow adoption of the joint (EP and EC, 2013) directives 
for the 2014-2020 budget period. This study does not cover political 
regionalism and is limited to the role of the regional institutional systems 
from the aspect of professional policy. 
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Introduction 
The ten countries acceding to the European Union on 1 May 2004 
joined right in the middle of a regional development cycle that was well 
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underway. So, the final two years of the 2000-2006 timeframe allowed the 
institutions of the new members to just get their feet wet in gauging the 
system and designing and implementing rules for monitoring the funds, 
despite earlier experience with pre-accession funding. The real test came 
with the first full seven-year period, from 2007 to 2013, which produced the 
first full absorption indices, and outcome and impact indicators. The two 
countries chosen for this study have similar histories, were much alike in 
their regional and economic features. There are also parallels regarding the 
orders of magnitude of the cohesion funds. The timeframes for learning to 
use the funds and the pre-accession funds were the same for both and their 
accession talks paralleled one another, giving them both a decade to get used 
to receiving and using the convergence monies. 
 
An overview of the 2007-2013 funding period 
This chapter offers a concise illustration of the overall size of the 
funding granted to the Central and Eastern European members over the 
seven-year period. It points out funding similarities for the different 
countries by presenting the subsidies on a per capita population basis. 
Although Poland received the largest quantitative support country-wise 
(Table 1), when broken down into per capita population figures we find that 
it was just the opposite. Poland received the lowest per capita funding of all 
the EU members in the region. The opposite was true for Hungary. It had the 
second-largest volume of per capita convergence funding, with only Estonia 
receiving more. If we exclude the data on Romania and Bulgaria, which 
acceded later, we find that significant differences in disbursement ratios 
began to emerge in 2012, and this is what I would like to focus on, using 
current data and specific examples. 
Table 1: Source: KPMG: EU funds in Central and Eastern Europe – Progress Report 2007-
2012 
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Table 2 compares the available development funds by type of 
intervention, and at this point the differing priorities of the two EU countries 
under investigation becomes apparent. If we specifically look at the volume 
of funding, we see that Poland used a far greater portion of its resources for 
human development and a lower one on infrastructure than Hungary. The 
biggest differences are in R&D and Infotech Communications (ITC) 
technology, where Poland spent five times more than Hungary. On the flip 
side, the Technical Assistance rubric, which includes the monies spent on 
usage management, was only twice as much in Poland as in Hungary despite 
Poland’s far larger overall funding amount and greater population. 
 
Table 2: Source: KPMG: EU funds in Central and Eastern Europe – Progress Report 2007-
2012 
  
Even the first table shows the difference in absorption rates between 
the two EU members we are focusing on with regard to the grants contracted 
and paid out up until 2012. We have the chance to show the picture in greater 
detail and extended to include the present by using the European 
Commission’s quarterly reports (EC, 2014). The most recent Financial 
Programming and Budget Report issued by the EU Directorate-General for 
Budget, which includes the grants from the three funds – the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, and the Cohesion 
Fund – used and accounted for by Brussels (not including advances) was 
issued on 15 April. Actual spending by the member countries was somewhat 
higher than the amount appearing in these latest statistics (in some cases 
submissions for approval from Brussels had not yet been submitted or had 
been submitted but still awaited Brussels’ verdict), but despite that a number 
of countries will need a near miracle to access the entire allotted amount by 
the end of next year, which is the n+2 deadline.  
 Excluding Croatia, (which acceded only recently and therefore had 
no comparative data), if we consider the list of the other 27 EU members in 
light of the April data, we will find Poland in 12th place with an absorption 
progression of 71 percent, and Hungary in 21st place with 62 percent. Of the 
countries acceding ten years ago, only the Baltic nations are ahead of Poland. 
Of course, the Baltic countries devoted a significant amount of the grants to 
SME development and venture capital funds, which statistically counts the 
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money as having already been spent (Balás, 2013). That is behind the high 
apparent access rate although they only will be able to give a final 
accounting of these monies to the EU after successful absorption. Another 
corrective factor relates to the countries that are entitled to Cohesion Funds 
in the first place. Of the countries ahead of Poland in absorption rates only 
Portugal and Greece receive these funds, which are intended for major 
infrastructural investments that require long preparatory and execution 
periods, and thus result in a prolonged period before the funds are accounted 
for. And then of course, ex post monitoring of Greece’s corruption issues 
could end up altering the list. But what the numbers actually boil down to is 
that Poland’s performance is outstanding when compared with all the 
countries that acceded in this century which includes the other countries in 
the Visegrád Group.   
Figure 1: The quarterly progression of Polish and Hungarian absorption (%) 
 
Source: Own work based on European Commission Regional and Urban Policy Finance and 
Budget Unit data 
 
 A look at the Figure illustrating semi-annual absorption progress 
(Figure 1) shows that Poland accessed nearly 10 percent more structural 
support than Hungary in 2012 and since then the gap has gotten wider still. 
When looking at the order under n+2 regulations, there are only four member 
countries with lower marks than Hungary, since Slovakia and Romania were 
granted an additional year in 2011 and 2012, to prevent them from losing 
funding. 
 There are additional extremes in access to the specific funds behind 
the averages (Figure 2). The statistics for the percentages accessed as of 
November 2013 show that Poland has not only done better overall, but also 
has had more balanced accounting rates per fund. 
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Figure 2: Absorption rate of the three funds – Comparison of Poland and Hungary 
 
Source: Own work based on European Commission Regional and Urban Policy Finance and 
Budget Unit data 
 
 Hungary’s access to 35 percent of the Cohesion Fund after a 
programme period of nearly seven years is particularly critical. The 
ostensible reason behind this is that Cohesion Funds are used for major 
projects which require long periods of preparation and institutional – 
generally EU – approval as well as other profession-specific permit 
processes and long periods of implementation. This was confirmed by a 
report issued by the State Audit Office of Hungary in 2012 (“Report on the 
evaluation of monitoring the bidding, designing and preparation of 
investment projects being financed as of 2007 with EU funds and 
implemented by government decision”), with other delays caused by 
prolonged public procurement procedures, problems with irregularities, and a 
lack of co-financing. The above, and an absence or alteration of specific 
strategies for the various sectors led to projects becoming bogged down or 
cancelled. The report cited above includes a plethora of shortcomings with 
the institutional support system which leads me to think it necessary to 
explore this factor by comparing the institutional systems of the two 
countries. 
 
The role of the institutional system in the efficient use of grant monies – 
theoretical background 
 One key to effectively accessing nominal supports is the system of 
institutions regulating it, operating on both member state and EU levels. 
Ederveen et al (2006) specifically state that structural funds are efficient in 
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countries where satisfactory systems of institutions are in place. Charron et al 
(2012) expanded on this in their study, by declaring that the level of national 
and regional governance and public administration is also an influential 
factor regarding efficient and successful access to the full amount of allotted 
cohesion funds. We can identify the institutional system responsible for fund 
use as a broader interpretation of Burnside’s and Dollar’s (2000) “supportive 
political environment” and of their approach suggesting that this is when 
cohesion policy works best. Professionals from the two examined countries 
under investigation agree with the above position. As Kozak (2006) wrote in 
the study about “European regional policy in Poland in the initial period after 
the accession:” 
“What is the only source of concern raised in relation to the 
preparation for the new planning period 2007–2013 (again, not backed by a 
sound strategy) is a reduction, once again, of the planning work on the 
management system to be ‘improved’ instead of creating a wholly new 
system, developed with a long term view and intended to attain the goals of 
Polish development policy implemented with the use of European funds, and 
not vice versa.” 
 Nyikos (2013), who has experience in Hungarian public 
administration, says that the effectiveness of regional policy is dependent on 
the efficiency with which the bodies controlling and managing it operate, and 
that general efficiency is dependent on the operation of the administration 
system. She adds the caveat that corruption and discriminatory phenomena 
can cause severe damage. 
 
An overview of the institutional systems connected to regional 
development funds in both countries, from EU accession to today 
In Hungary, Act XXI of 1996 on regional development and territory 
regulation (hereinafter: Tftv.) underlined the importance of planning and 
defining the system of regional development institutions and the tools to be 
made available to them. The planning rested on a concept of regional 
development which was defined as the comprehensive and perspective 
development of an entire region. This was the foundation for a regional 
development strategy with regional territory development projects and 
medium term action plans in the superstructure (Kovács, I.P, 2003). In 
addition, the law provided a framework for starting up “learn as you go” 
regional development. The regional level was clearly designed at the urging 
of the European Union, primarily to coordinate the level with the use of EU 
funds (Phare followed by structural funds). At the same time, the parallels 
with the national and county structures were retained and the only clear 
distinctions between them regarding responsibilities and competencies were 
funding-related (Döbrönte-Vida, 2011). An ex post impact study conducted 
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within the framework of the Operative Program for Government Reform 
found that “prior to 1 January 2012 the large number of regional levels 
(micro-region, county, region, priority region, and national) resulted in 
unnecessary parallels and low levels of efficiency, weakened even further by 
parallel systems of institutions managing domestic and EU funds and 
regulating use of the grant monies.” (Magyary Programme 2012, p.16). The 
changes in the system of regional development institutions as of 1 January 
2012 led to transferring regional development tasks to county governments 
and putting an end to the micro-regional and regional level development 
councils. 
The loss of stability resulting from the above changes also means a 
loss of the professional knowledge, experience, and partnership-information 
of the various actors – regional/county/micro-regional development 
organizations and the bodies involved in managing the way the operative 
programmes are run – that had been accumulated through their work 
experience. Another loss is of the time during which it would become 
possible for the individual actors to get involved in planning the regional 
development. This had also occurred at the start of the 2007-2013 
programming period when the micro-regional level, the equivalent of NUTS 
VI, was directly subordinated to the Regional Development Agency when 
shaping the regional operative programmes, which left out the county level 
completely. Serious shortcomings of this planning period included failure to 
take advantage of the knowledge and human resource capacities accumulated 
among the participants in county development projects, obtained through the 
placement and management of supports that had been provided by domestic 
budgets before the change. And we are now facing the hazard of this process 
being repeated, albeit the other way around, during the forthcoming seven 
year programme period. The version of the Tftv. amended in 2012 
essentially defined two regional levels (county and national) to take the place 
of the five earlier ones, as it restored the regional breakdown that had been in 
effect before Hungary joined the EU. Restoration of county level authority, 
elimination of the micro-regions, and relegating the regions to secondary 
significance may trigger delays or shortcomings in the channelling of the 
past seven years of experience into the designing of the new system of 
objectives and/or methods of implementing the forthcoming operative 
programmes. This same problem surfaces when the authorities coordinating 
usage and managing strategies are chosen. The authorities were linked to the 
sectors from 2004 to 2006, then to a central organization (the National 
Development Agency) which ran from 2007 to 2013, and has now been 
shifted back to the ministries with an operative program for regional 
development to manage funding for 2014 to 2020. The change was a 
response to a real demand. Perger (2010) urged the establishment of a 
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comprehensive strategic management formation that ran powerful 
coordination and monitoring mechanisms while granting the sectoral and 
regional players increased latitude in planning and execution. The successive 
changes encompassing nearly a decade and a half are not promoting either 
current implementation or future planning operations. We will explore the 
latter in the next chapter. 
Poland was later than Hungary in carrying out a public administration 
reform on the regional development plane, which in contrast with Hungary, 
was real instead of merely statistical. The outcome was that its regional 
policy became an autonomous sectoral policy. While the institutional system 
is an integral part of the sectoral management system it nevertheless operates 
in a decentralized manner when managing the decentralized operative 
programmes (Mezei, Schmidt, 2013).  Poland was the only country to 
include NUTS 2 regions as autonomous units of public administration and 
local government ten years ago when joining the European Union. This 
divided authorities for regional development operations between local 
government and central government actors (Perger, 2010). It was also the 
only one of the Eastern and Central European countries to build its public 
administration reform and system of regional development institutions in a 
parallel and coherent manner. Poland does not have the regional 
development councils which are customary elsewhere in Central and Eastern 
Europe. To this day it lacks a regional development law, and it has not set up 
any autonomous institution to receive the EU funds. Instead, it has achieved 
real decentralization in which the regions have true decision-making rights, 
access to development funds, development programmes built up from the 
bottom up, and contracts for planning that guarantee the implementation of 
those programmes (Mezei, Schmidt, 2013. p.123). The elected local 
governments of the newly established voivodeships (provinces) – as opposed 
to the Hungarian regional development councils – are not merely players 
listed in support policies that are entitled to distribute certain minimal funds, 
for they are also the local social and economic development actors, thanks to 
true decentralization. 
Poland is a good example of how regional development tasks can be 
shifted from top-down management of the local government sector to 
bottom-up mode. The two experts sum up their discourse by saying that all 
of this together heightens the legitimacy of the development policy and 
reinforces its integration, as evidenced by successful developments already 
completed and the rising absorption abilities of the regions. 
 
Current issues in preparing the 2014-2020 programming cycle 
The differences in absorption in the 2007-2013 programme cycle as 
well as in the preparations for the 2014-2020 budget cycle might be the 
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outcome of differences in the institutional systems. As far as preparations are 
concerned, we need to point out that as of the end of March 2014, 12 
member countries had submitted the documents required for the Partnership 
Agreements and operative programmes as called for in the preparatory phase 
of the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework to the European 
Commission. Poland was the first. On 10 January it submitted the Agreement 
to the EC as well as the documents for six operative programmes requiring 
use of Structural and Investment Funds. Hungary submitted its proposal for 
the Partnership Agreement two months later, but did not attach a draft for the 
operative programmes, which might have been because of parliamentary 
elections occurring in the interim. The processes of preparation are not 
competing against one other but are racing against the n+3 timeframe for 
using the monies. Nonetheless, the time of submission becomes important 
because if coordination talks are prolonged, they will cut into the time 
needed for project execution and the accounting process. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study has presented an overview of professional literature 
exploring the effects of the institutional systems on the use of regional 
development funds. It clearly supports the view that both project feasibility 
and implementation quality depend on the institutional setup which regulates 
them. Medium term impact studies are the primary sources of information on 
quality spending while the quarterly reports of the Directorate-General’s 
Budget offer a great deal of interim information on the progress of 
absorption. The Polish example shows a truly – and not merely statistically 
evolved – satisfactory structure that is also sound as regards continuity, while 
as far as Hungary is concerned, continuous change – sometimes even within 
a programming cycle – rather than continuity is apparent in the institutional 
system of regional policy. This weakens the legitimacy, integration and 
transparency of development policy, which can be reflected in both the 
quality of spending and absorption ability. Possible outcomes are that some 
of the development funding remains unused or that it becomes necessary to 
prolong the deadline for accessing the monies similarly to Romania and 
Slovakia. In support of this, the economic downturn that began in 2008 
slowed down the use of economic development funds, and European Council 
Directive [P7_TA(2013)0455] Chapter 2 (Special Instruments), Article 11 
(Flexibility Instrument) (EC, 2013) have already introduced n+3 
accessibility. 
 The lesson in this case is the continued validity of the conclusions 
reached by Mezei and Schmidt in a study published last year, to the effect 
that it cannot hurt to maintain a certain degree of stability in the regulation of 
regional development and the system of institutions employed and that if 
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decentralization is real it is possible to exploit the opportunities inherent in 
bottom-up planning and initiatives. Stability also makes it possible to retain 
the knowledge accumulated within the various regional development 
institutions and participating organizations. And last, but not least, local and 
regional players need to be given the time to join the regional planning and 
procedures. I would like to conclude this study with Polish analyst Marek 
Kozak (2006) who adds the following thought and points the way towards 
additional research topics. “EU money is only a tool (…), it is not important 
how much money will be spent. What matters is what we will achieve with 
it.” 
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